



Australian Community Futures Planning

We have it in our power to create the world anew

21 April 2023

SUBMISSION

Reforming defence legislation to meet Australia's strategic needs

Australian Community Futures Planning (ACFP) is pleased to make this submission on reforming defence legislation.

ACFP was established in March 2020. It is a community-based planning and research entity that is organising to involve Australians in planning a better future for themselves as a nation and for future generations. At ACFP we are using a new community engagement and planning process called: **National Integrated Planning & Reporting** to create **Australia's first national community futures plan, *Australia Together***. Find out more about [Australia Together](#).

At Australian Community Futures Planning we are working to bring Australians together to plan their own future as a nation.



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has been established to help Australians
build a better

Australia Together

This submission is made by the Founder of ACFP, Dr Bronwyn Kelly. Dr Kelly is a highly experienced former senior public servant in state and local government. She is an expert in the field of national integrated planning and reporting and the author of:

- [By 2050: Planning a better future for our children in 21st century democratic Australia](#) (2020); and
- [The People's Constitution: The path to empowerment of Australians in a 21st century democracy](#) (2023).



She is also:

- the creator and presenter of the videocast series, [The State of Australia in 2020](#), [The State of Australia 2022](#), [Snapshots from Australia Together](#), the [Better Futures Commitment Index](#), and [What is Integrated Planning & Reporting?](#);
- an essayist on issues for Australian governance;
- an Honorary Professional Fellow at the University of Technology Sydney's Institute for Public Policy and Governance (2014 to 2021);
- principal author and co-ordinator of [Australia Together](#), Australia's first long term, integrated community futures plan;
- co-author of Australia's first comprehensive report on the performance of an elected federal parliament – [The State of Australia 2022 – End of Term Report on the 46th Parliament of Australia](#); and
- creator of the [Australia Together National Wellbeing Index](#).

For detailed information about ACFP, visit our website at <https://www.austcfp.com.au/>
Australian Community Futures Planning has no affiliation with any political party inside or outside Australia. It receives no funding from political parties or other sources. All output from ACFP is supported entirely by voluntarily supplied non-monetary in-kind contributions.



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Executive Summary

Australian Community Futures Planning (ACFP) submits that proposed Defence Act changes as canvassed in the [Public Consultation Paper](#) do not support the national interest and in several ways run fully counter to it. By embedding permissions for aggression in our defence system they seriously threaten our wellbeing and security and are entirely inconsistent with Australian values.

We submit that the government should take note of the points and objections raised by the Independent and Peaceful Australia Network (IPAN), particularly in relation to:

- the need to confine the Defence Act to ensure the Department concentrates on defence not aggression;
- the need to explicitly prohibit the use of nuclear weapons;
- the need to submit to parliamentary rule on the determination to enter a war;
- the need to ensure state and territory legislation is not overridden in such a way as to expose Australia and Australians to health or security risks;
- the need to abandon programs of interoperability of our defence force and assets with that of any other nation;
- the need to ensure maintenance of Australia's independence and sovereignty on all matters of war and defence;
- the need to prohibit military bases in Australia for any other nation including the United States of America, a clearly aggressive and unstable country bent on sacrificing the interests of all other nations to its own interests and which holds values that (contrary to the Australian government's current propaganda) are NOT those of Australia. (For evidence of Australian values see [The People's Constitution: the path to empowerment of Australians in a 21st century democracy](#).); and
- the need to preserve the rights of Australians to protest against foreign or domestic military assets or military activities which support wars that are not in the interests of the Australian people.

In addition to our concurrence with the points and objections made by IPAN, ACFP also asserts that the "Guiding Principles for Reform" put forward by the Department of Defence in the consultation paper are highly problematic insofar as they run counter to the values of Australians. We submit that:

1. the entire reform process should be shelved; and
2. it should be replaced with a fully inclusive strategic planning process in which Australians can participate to define the nation's strategic interests and acceptable paths towards the maintenance of those interests (that is, paths that are consistent with their values as espoused by them, not by governments).

1. Introduction – the principles promoted by Defence are antithetical to the values of Australians

Australian Community Futures Planning is a centre of excellence in long term integrated planning for Australia. We supply Australians with the tools and data they need to be able to participate in developing Australia’s first long term integrated plan for the future of their society, environment, economy and democracy, [Australia Together](#). This involves use of a strategic planning process called [National Integrated Planning & Reporting or National IP&R](#), a process which in turn relies on our development of the [Australia Together National Wellbeing Index](#).


Federal public servants know very little about National IP&R but, put simply, it is a process whereby they can work with Australians in an inclusive democratic framework to build a plan for a much better, safer and sustainable future.

The basis of National IP&R is to examine Australian values, aspirations, our preferred vision for the future and our preferred paths towards that destination of wellbeing and security. ACFP is constantly scanning surveys and research on the preferences of Australians for the type of nation they want to build, the principles they stand for, their idea of Australia’s place in the world, the features of a national character that they aspire to and the type of society to which they wish to belong. We document all this research and the findings in *Australia Together* and most recently have expanded significantly on research about Australian values in Chapter 5 of [The People’s Constitution: the path to empowerment of Australians in a 21st century democracy](#) by ACFP’s Founder Bronwyn Kelly. All this is used to develop targets and strategies which will reliably and safely propel Australia towards the future Australians have said they prefer.


The research in *The People’s Constitution* has established a set of human-centric values that Australians are likely to hold in the 2020s. The findings indicate that Australian values have evolved in the last twenty years and do not align with “Guiding Principles for Reform” upon which the defence legislation review has been based. Australians value peace, not war and as their values are articulated on survey, they especially do not suggest that Australians wish their defence force to be positioned as the “an agile, integrated war-fighting enterprise” preferred in the Defence consultation paper. Indeed the value placed by Australians on nationalism and the type of mateship Australians have exhibited and venerated in war during the 20th century has been in decline. These two values have sunk further in our estimation than any other social values held by Australians in the 21st century.

In that context is it unfortunate and entirely inappropriate for those reviewing the defence legislation to imply that war as an “enterprise” or war *per se* is anything other than absolutely antithetical to the values that Australians hold for peace, global cooperation and responsible international citizenry. [The research in The People’s Constitution](#) strongly indicates that Australians value peace not war and certainly not war as an “enterprise” with all its implications of commercial benefit for a few via the death of millions and possible extinction of cultures and other species (see

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Chapter 5 of [The People's Constitution: the path to empowerment of Australians in a 21st century democracy](#)).

The “guiding principle” of “flexibility” relied on in the consultation paper is also an insult to the values of Australians inasmuch as Defence has promoted it to justify a “technology-neutral legislative framework”. Wary Australians can justifiably take this to mean that Defence is seeking to create a legislative basis for nuclear and/or chemical weapons. Defence suggests that legislation should “avoid prescription as far as possible, reducing rigid and inflexible approaches to the conduct of Defence activities”. ACFP would suggest in reply that when it comes to licensing the defence forces to kill and murder the people of other sovereign nations, expose our own people as targets and lay the natural environment open to destruction, legislation should be heavily prescriptive – even more prescriptive than it is now. The aggressive focus of the Defence Department and forces should be tightly reined in to keep Australia safe. Above all the Defence Department should not be given legislative authority to start a war.

Please note that ACFP does not accept the assertion by Defence that “Australia is increasingly faced with challenges to our national interests and regional security and stability, including a complex strategic environment of competition and coercion”. Defence has provided no evidence for this assertion. The more correct assertion would be that in its pugnacious alliance with America Australia is playing a big role in *causing* regional instability where none existed before. If we are facing it, it is because we are causing it. In line with that it would appear that Defence assumes it is permissible (or should be permissible) to cause illegal wars – that is, to make a law to do something illegal – and that Australians believe (or can be persuaded to think) that this is permissible. We reiterate, that there is no evidence to support an assertion that Australians have avowed support for illegal wars.

In summary, the published principles by which the defence legislation review is being conducted are not the principles of Australians. They are simply poised to turn the Department of Defence into a Department of Aggression. The whole defence and security mindset of the government is wrong and does not match with the values of 21st century Australians. This pertains no matter how much Penny Wong may insist that cooperative diplomacy accompanied by development of a war machine sufficient to present effective “deterrence” to China (regardless of whether China has the same sort of global hegemonic agenda as America) is consistent with the values of Australians and their national interest. [Her prescription](#) for achieving “balance” in the region by “strategic reassurance through diplomacy supported by military deterrence” is fundamentally antithetical to our values and interests, particularly as it is more likely to cause a war than prevent it.

2. A strategic approach to defence of the nation

ACFP submits that it is neither wise nor respectful to develop a program of defence legislation outside the context of Australian values and outside a specification by Australians themselves of what is genuinely in the national interest and what is not. Too often, Australian governments assert that they are developing policies in the national interest without ever specifying in intelligible detail their assumptions as to what the national interest is and without ever providing evidence that Australians concur with that version of our interests.

We assert therefore that before any new legislative program is designed to ensure our defence forces will be capable of serving the national interest, the government should seek the views of Australians as to that interest. Specifically we suggest that:

1. Australians be given the chance to participate in development of an Integrated Strategy for Defence, Diplomacy and Security.

2. Preparatory to this, federal parliament should defer all defence legislative reforms currently under consideration and instead legislate to develop a process of engagement with Australians to develop a “Statement of Australia’s Strategic Interests in Territorial Sovereign Defence”. Such legislation should ensure the community engagement process cannot be interfered with by foreign stakeholders (such as ASPI) or the Department of Defence itself. Defence clearly has a conflict of interest in setting a strategic framework for its own expansion and has not displayed any ability at all to rise above this conflict. On the contrary, their principles suggest they are in thrall to weapons manufacturers.

ACFP’s suggested development of an Integrated Strategy for Defence Diplomacy and Security – based on a Statement of Australia’s Strategic Interests in Territorial Sovereign Defence that has been devised by inclusive involvement of Australians – is part of the strategic approach already outlined in *Australia Together* for purposes of the nation’s peace and security. This is set out in Chapter 8 of *Australia Together* in the section headed “Governance 12 – Peace & security”. A full copy of that section is supplied as **Attachment A**. The section currently contains multiple integrated strategies for peace and security which are connected to other strategies in several other parts of the whole plan. These integrated strategies are expected to grow over time. At present they include:

Australia Together – Issue No. 6, July 2022	
Indicators, Targets and Strategies for the success of Our Governance	
Governance 12 – Peace & Security	
Gov12.01	Australian involvement in military operations
Gov12.01.01	Australian preference for peace versus war
Gov12.01.02	Australian preference and readiness for an independent defence capability versus dependence on the US alliance
Gov12.02	Prohibition of weapons exports
Gov12.03	Prohibition of funding of public institutions by foreign owned or domestically owned/operated arms dealers or manufacturers
Gov12.04	Integrated Strategy for Defence, Diplomacy and Security
Gov12.04.01	Green Paper and community engagement to define Australia’s Strategic Interests in Territorial Sovereign Defence
Gov12.05	Development of the capacity of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and abolition of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)

The two central strategies for the Department of Defence’s purposes here are:

1. Gov12.04 – Integrated Strategy for Defence, Diplomacy and Security

which states that:

By 2023, recognising that:

- a strategy of over-reliance on expansion of defence for maintenance of an aggressive footing in international relations (rather than a genuinely defensive footing) is both insupportably expensive and ultimately futile for Australia, and that
- we are living through an era of both irreversible globalisation and superpower shifts (China and Asia rising, the West in relative decline and instability), and that
- Australia’s national security is largely dependent on economic security which in turn is dependent on a positive relationship with China and Asia, and that
- because Australia’s defence policy is set towards aggression in the Oceania region and our diplomatic stance and policies are likewise set towards hawkishness and containment rather than peace and global collaboration, they are undermining not improving national security and the risk of war,

develop a draft **integrated defence, diplomacy and security strategy** to ensure peace in our region based on acknowledgement of the following geopolitical realities for the 21st century:

- that Australia's traditional allies of the USA and the UK cannot and should not be relied on to come to Australia's aid in the event of a military or economic threat from an external source;
- that Australia cannot expect that in the event of a global clash between superpowers (China, the USA, Russia) that Asian countries (eg., Japan and India or Indonesia) will side with Australia against China;
- that continuation of the post-WWII exclusive reliance on the USA alliance and the ANZUS Treaty now works against Australian security objectives wherever and whenever pursuit of the USA's objectives and interests undermines stability in the Oceania region;
- that the only feasible strategy for Australia in armed conflict is to avoid it entirely and that soft power resources – built steadily on the basis of ethical and cooperative behaviour by Australia in trade, climate change, human rights, humanitarian aid, observance of the rule of law, and just participation in global forums (the UN, WTO, WHO) – are therefore the most reliable means (economically and strategically) by which Australia may secure its people and borders;

and acknowledge that, given these new geopolitical realities, Australia cannot afford an approach to foreign relations in which strategies for defence and diplomacy are set to disable strategies for security, independence, sovereignty, growth in national resilience, and peace.

By 2024, establish a fully open program of community engagement on the draft **integrated defence, diplomacy and security strategy**, and incorporate feedback on the potential of the draft strategy to achieve the primary objectives of security, national resilience, economic prosperity and peace in our region.

1. Gov12.04.01 – Green Paper and community engagement to define Australia's Strategic Interests in Territorial Sovereign Defence

which states that:

By 2023, preparatory to process for development of the Integrated Strategy for Defence, Diplomacy and Security in [Gov12.04](#), federal parliament will legislate to develop a process of engagement with Australians to develop a **Statement of Australia's Strategic Interests in Territorial Sovereign Defence**.

Ensure the Green Paper and community engagement process are overseen by DFAT or, if necessary, by another duly appointed independent commission of public engagement with powers to:

- conduct genuine, fully open and well informed public engagement;
- report transparently to parliament on the preferences of Australians for such a Statement; and ultimately
- design a Statement that will provide sufficient guidance to parliaments and ensure that any decisions made on territorial defence will in fact be in the acknowledged best interests of Australians and will thereby safeguard our independence, sovereignty, security and peace.

As a minimum, the Green Paper should include options for:

- a) a process by which the nature and limits of Australia's geopolitical interests may be determined and reviewed every three years in open consultation with Australians; and
- b) draft principles for possible inclusion in the Statement governing decisions on:
 - entry into and exit from participation in wars and any other form of military deployment or incursion,
 - escalation and de-escalation of military involvement beyond Australia's borders,
 - entry into and exit from military alliances,

- entry into and exit from treaties which relate to maintenance of peace or prevention/cessation of wars,
- permissible occupation or prohibition of foreign military and associated intelligence capability on Australian soil,
- permissible entry of foreign military forces and transports to Australian waters and ports,
- acquisition by the Australian Defence Force of weapons and major military hardware, such as submarines, warships, aircraft, landing equipment, drones, tanks, bombs and other large scale incendiary devices, and detection and surveillance technology,
- international cooperation to reduce and/or eliminate nuclear weapons, and
- plans to restructure and equip Australia's military to concentrate on territorial sovereign defence.

For the full context and background of these strategies, see **Attachment A**.

Conclusion

Australian Community Futures Planning submits that Defence is taking a high-handed and very dangerous approach to defence of the nation that has not been authorised by the nation. Until such time as Defence shows that:

- there is substantial evidence that Australians feel assured that their strategic interests have been openly, faithfully and comprehensively specified; and that
- their interests so specified are indeed supported by Australians through a process of confirmation,

development of an aggressive “war-fighting enterprise” and a legislative framework which is so “flexible” as to allow Defence to do anything it arbitrarily pleases and to ignore and act contrary to the national interest (including by “technology-neutral” policies) will have no legitimacy. Because this is a life and death matter for Australians it will also have no moral authority.

ACFP submits that the defence legislative reform program be abandoned and a new process for establishing ethical principles for Australia's defence take precedence. This process must have full and open community engagement. There need be no secrecy in this matter. The ability of Australians to design what is and isn't in their national interest is not a threat to the nation's security; it is fundamental to securing the future of the sort of nation we want, the one worth fighting for. The government should inspire Australians about the place we can take as a leading peacemaker in the world and forget strategies which make us a monger for wars we cannot win.

In short, ACFP recommends Defence go back and start all over again and involve Australians in development of proper principles for selection of defence policies rather than impose principles which do not align with Australian values.

Attachment A – Extract from *Australia Together*

Governance 12 – Peace & security

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for the success of Our Governance		
Governance 12 – Peace & security		
Indicators, Targets & Strategies for successful performance	In the Directions of becoming ...	Baseline data
<p>Australian involvement in military operations Gov12.01 Participation by Australian armed forces as combatants in military operations (other than genuine peacekeeping and humanitarian aid sanctioned by the United Nations) is zero unless Australia has been directly attacked or unless both houses of parliament agree in the majority that its security has been directly, demonstrably and imminently threatened.</p>	Gov 12 A nation assured of enduring peace.	<p>Between 1945 and 2021, Australian military forces participated in no less than 10 military operations overseas, none of which were the result of a direct or indirect threat to Australia’s security and only one of which could be justified on genuine humanitarian grounds (East Timor). Source: Wikipedia, List of Wars Involving Australia</p>
	Gov 2 A nation knowing & affirming decency.	
	Gov 6 A world benchmark in leaders' conduct.	
	Gov 11 A just participant on the global stage.	
	Gov 13 A nation leading in empathy & global cohesion.	
	Soc 1 A safe home.	
<p>Australian preference for peace versus war Gov12.01.01 The proportion of Australians preferring neutral postures in military conflicts does not diminish.</p>	Gov 12 A nation assured of enduring peace.	<p>In 2021, the Lowy Institute stated that “Australians have become increasingly wary of military engagement in some parts of the world, and support for deploying military forces has been consistently low for hypothetical scenarios involving China”.</p>
	Gov 2 A nation knowing & affirming decency.	
	Gov 4 A free, self-governing, modern nation.	<p>In the 2021 Lowy Poll, in relation to a military conflict between China and the US, Australians preferred a passive, neutral response:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 57% said “Australia should remain neutral”; • 41% said “Australia should support the United States”; and • 1% said “Australia should support China”. <p>The Lowy Institute noted that, “There is a stark divide between the youngest and oldest Australians on this question: only one in five (21%) Australians aged 18–29 say Australia should</p>
	Gov 6 A world benchmark in leaders' conduct.	
	Gov 11 A just participant on the global stage.	
Gov 13 A nation leading in empathy & global cohesion.		

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for the success of Our Governance

Governance 12 – Peace & security

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for successful performance	In the Directions of becoming ...	Baseline data
	<p>Soc 1 A safe home.</p>	<p>support the United States in the case of conflict, a view held by the majority (58%) of Australians aged over 60.” Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2021</p>
<p>Australian preference and readiness for an independent defence capability versus dependence on the US alliance Gov12.01.02 Australians’ support for the US alliance does not detract from its capacity to develop independent defence capability and does not lead Australia into instigation of military conflict or other involvement in military conflict that may be inconsistent with the Statement of Australia’s Strategic Interests in Territorial Sovereign Defence to be developed by the Green Paper and community engagement process under Gov12.04.01.</p>	<p>Gov 12 A nation assured of enduring peace.</p>	<p>Between 2005 and 2019, an average of 77% of Australians on survey reported support for Australia’s alliance with the US.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The lowest support was in 2007 – 63%. • The highest support was in 2010 – 86%. <p>Source: Lowy Institute Poll 2021</p>
	<p>Gov 2 A nation knowing & affirming decency.</p>	<p>In 2019, a turning point in Australia’s understanding of the utility and future of the US alliance was marked by Hugh White, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University, as follows: “The simple, historical fact is that Western powers, and especially our great allies Britain and America, have been able to dominate Asia strategically and keep Australia safe because they have been far richer, stronger and more technologically advanced than any Asian rival. The rise of these immense Asian powers means those material foundations of Western preponderance have decayed, and without them the Western position in Asia, which we have taken for granted and depended on for so long, cannot last. Indeed, its passing is already far advanced. This changes fundamentally the nature of Australia’s strategic choices. For the first time we have to contemplate defending ourselves independently. ... It means that ‘defending ourselves’ must now encompass defending ourselves from a major Asian</p>
	<p>Gov 4 A free, self-governing, modern nation.</p>	
	<p>Gov 6 A world benchmark in leaders' conduct.</p>	
	<p>Gov 11 A just participant on the global stage.</p>	
	<p>Gov 13 A nation leading in empathy & global cohesion.</p>	

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for the success of Our Governance

Governance 12 – Peace & security

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for successful performance	In the Directions of becoming ...	Baseline data
	<p>Soc 1 A safe home.</p>	<p>power without the substantive help of a major-power ally, or committing our forces alongside those of Asian neighbours rather than relying on Western allies to protect our strategic interests.” Source: Hugh White, How to Defend Australia, La Trobe University Press, 2019, page 316, Scribd edition.</p>
<p>Prohibition of weapons exports Gov12.02 By 2024, legislate to totally prohibit exports of any and all weapons and any military specific goods and technology (eg., ammunition, missiles, armoured vehicles, military vessels and enabling software, hardware and targeting systems) from Australia to any other country.</p>	<p>Gov 12 A nation assured of enduring peace.</p> <p>Gov 2 A nation knowing & affirming decency.</p> <p>Gov 6 A world benchmark in leaders' conduct.</p> <p>Gov 9 A nation outlawing corporate greed & encouraging private sector ethics & community partnership.</p> <p>Gov 11 A just participant on the global stage.</p> <p>Gov 13 A nation leading in empathy & global cohesion.</p> <p>Soc 1 A safe home.</p> <p>Soc 15 Confident of justice for all.</p>	<p>In 2014, Australia led in the United Nations Security Council with the development of the Arms Trade Treaty and ratified this legally binding instrument. But in 2018, Australia earmarked the Middle East as a “priority market” in its Defence Export Strategy, publicly pursuing weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (then making war and humanitarian crises in Yemen and breaching multiple international laws) in direct contravention of the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty which requires Australia to take into account the risk that arms exports will be used “to commit or facilitate acts of gender-based or serious acts of violence against women and children.” Between 2018 and 2021 Defence Department approvals for export of weapons rose from \$1.5 billion to \$5 billion. Source: United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, Commonwealth Government Defence Export Strategy 2018</p>
<p>Prohibition of funding of public institutions and officials by foreign-owned or domestically owned/operated arms dealers or manufacturers Gov12.03 By 2024, recognising the potential that donations, gifts and other in-kind favours from arms dealers, manufacturers and their agents will give rise to actions by government officials and public sector agents that are</p>	<p>Gov 12 A nation assured of enduring peace.</p> <p>Gov 5 Open, transparent & accountable in its governments & institutions.</p>	<p>In 2021, nothing in Australian statutes sufficiently prevented arms dealers, manufacturers and their agents from attempting to influence Australian officials in national security and related policy/contractual decisions through pecuniary and non-pecuniary donations, gifts and in-kind favours.</p>

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for the success of Our Governance

Governance 12 – Peace & security

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for successful performance	In the Directions of becoming ...	Baseline data
<p>contrary to Australia’s sovereign interests and national security, legislate to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> totally prohibit direct and indirect funding of all public institutions and government instrumentalities (including universities, government run cultural facilities, museums, memorials, and policy development/administrative / operational entities) by foreign owned or domestically owned/operated arms dealers or manufacturers and their agents or associates; prohibit any private entity (foreign or domestic) from qualifying for state or federal government contracts if they have received funding – either financial or in-kind, directly or indirectly – from foreign or domestically based arms dealers, manufacturers or their agents/associates at any time from the date of assent to the legislation onwards; prohibit donations to political parties and candidates/elected representatives in federal, state and local government by foreign or domestically owned/based arms dealers, manufacturers or their agents; and prohibit post-separation employment of elected members of state and federal parliament with consulting, lobbying or other corporate entities operating in association with arms dealers, manufacturers or their agents for a period of five years after relinquishing their elected office. 	<p>Gov 6 A world benchmark in leaders' conduct.</p>	
	<p>Gov 7 Committed to public service independence & excellence.</p>	
	<p>Gov 8 Protected from undue sectional influence in elections.</p>	
	<p>Gov 9 A nation outlawing corporate greed & encouraging private sector ethics & community partnership.</p>	
	<p>Gov 11 A just participant on the global stage.</p>	
	<p>Gov 13 A nation leading in empathy & global cohesion.</p>	
	<p>Soc 1 A safe home.</p>	

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for the success of Our Governance

Governance 12 – Peace & security

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for successful performance	In the Directions of becoming ...	Baseline data
<p>Top Priority Target/Strategy: Integrated Strategy for Defence, Diplomacy and Security Gov12.04</p> <p>By 2023, recognising that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a strategy of over-reliance on expansion of defence for maintenance of an aggressive footing in international relations (rather than a genuinely defensive footing) is both insupportably expensive and ultimately futile for Australia, and that we are living through an era of both irreversible globalisation and superpower shifts (China and Asia rising, the West in relative decline and instability), and that Australia’s national security is largely dependent on economic security which in turn is dependent on a positive relationship with China and Asia, and that because Australia’s defence policy is set towards aggression in the Oceania region and our diplomatic stance and policies are likewise set towards hawkishness and containment rather than peace and global collaboration, they are undermining not improving national security and the risk of war, <p>develop a draft integrated defence, diplomacy and security strategy to ensure peace in our region based on acknowledgement of the</p>	<p>Gov 12 A nation assured of enduring peace.</p>	<p>In 2019, the Australian National Outlook 2019 identified a direct connection between the incidence of fractious international relations and slow economic decline for Australia. They identified that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> in the case of fractious global relations: “National and protectionist rhetoric stalls global trade, economic growth slows, population increases and there is no firm action on climate change, resulting in a global average temperature rise of 4°C by 2100.”; but on the other hand in the case of cooperative global relations: “Global trade and geopolitical tensions are more positive than they are today, populations increase, but at the low end of projections, and there is effective global action on climate change to limit global average temperature rises to 2°C by 2100.” <p>In effect, the Australian National Outlook 2019 identified that up to the year 2060, the prospects for positive economic outcomes for Australia (GDP growth per capita) are halved in the event of fractious international relations. Source: NAB & CSIRO, Australian National Outlook, 2019</p> <p>In 2020, Australia’s relationship with its biggest trading partner, China, deteriorated significantly, resulting in the loss of between \$19 billion and \$40 billion in</p>
	<p>Gov 2 A nation knowing & affirming decency.</p>	
	<p>Gov 6 A world benchmark in leaders' conduct.</p>	
	<p>Gov 11 A just participant on the global stage.</p>	

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for the success of Our Governance

Governance 12 – Peace & security

Indicators, Targets & Strategies for successful performance	In the Directions of becoming ...	Baseline data
<p>following geopolitical realities for the 21st century:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> that Australia’s traditional allies of the USA and the UK cannot and should not be relied on to come to Australia’s aid in the event of a military or economic threat from an external source; that Australia cannot expect that in the event of a global clash between superpowers (China, the USA, Russia) that Asian countries (eg., Japan and India or Indonesia) will side with Australia against China; that continuation of the post-WWII exclusive reliance on the USA alliance and the ANZUS Treaty now works against Australian security objectives wherever and whenever pursuit of the USA’s objectives and interests undermines stability in the Oceania region; that the only feasible strategy for Australia in armed conflict is to avoid it entirely and that soft power resources – built steadily on the basis of ethical and cooperative behaviour by Australia in trade, climate change, human rights, humanitarian aid, observance of the rule of 	<p>Gov 13 A nation leading in empathy & global cohesion.</p>	<p>annual exports to China. But in 2021, Australia:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> had no strategy in place either for restoring relations with China or restoring our reputation as a mature, respected collaborative, trading and research partner with other countries; in foreign policy, was stoking fractiousness with China, rather than developing policies to ensure that China’s inevitable global ascendancy will work in Australia’s favour; was over-reliant on expansion of defence and “hard power” hawkish stances that are provocative of war, and was under-reliant on diplomatic strategy and accumulation of “soft power” for prevention of war. <p>Source: Australian Community Futures Planning, The State of Australia in 2020, Episode 4 Part 2.</p> <p>See Note¹ for further baseline analysis and reference materials.</p>
	<p>Soc 1 A safe home.</p>	
	<p>Econ 9 Productive & prosperous through fair & ethical trade agreements, labour hire & procurement.</p>	

¹ In early 2021, Australian attitudes to foreign policy and relations were mixed. While the Australian government promoted military build-up by reliance on “drums of war” rhetoric and claims that “[everyday Australians](#)” supported getting prepared for war (rather than getting prepared to avoid it), Australians themselves in the majority rejected confrontation, as evidenced by the fact that in the [Lowy Institute Poll 2021](#), “when asked about a military conflict between China and the United States, more than half the population (57%) said ‘Australia should remain neutral’” and the [Institute commented further that](#) “Australians do not want regional competition to slide into confrontation.” In the same Lowy Institute Poll, however, 75% of respondents said that “The United States would come to Australia’s defence if Australia was under threat,” implying a degree of complacency among Australians (in relation to pro-US foreign policy and its efficacy in the event of military threats) that was at odds with what several experienced diplomats, analysts and commentators saw as a necessary shift in strategic relationships in the Oceania region, due to the rise of China. Recommended policy shifts included those of:

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<p>law, and just participation in global forums (the UN, WTO, WHO) – are therefore the most reliable means (economically and strategically) by which Australia may secure its people and borders; and acknowledge that, given these new geopolitical realities, Australia cannot afford an approach to foreign relations in which strategies for defence and diplomacy are set to disable strategies for security, independence, sovereignty, growth in national resilience, and peace.</p> <p>By 2024, establish a fully open program of community engagement on the draft integrated defence, diplomacy and security strategy, and incorporate feedback on the potential of the draft strategy to achieve the primary objectives of security, national resilience, economic prosperity and peace in our region.</p>		
<p>Top Priority Target/Strategy: Green Paper and community engagement to define Australia’s Strategic Interests in Territorial Sovereign Defence Gov12.04.01 By 2023, preparatory to process for development of the</p>	<p>Gov 12 A nation assured of enduring peace.</p>	<p>In 2017:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 72.7% of Australians on survey supported a “ban on nuclear weapons, as a step towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons”. Only 11.3% opposed a ban, and

- experienced diplomat [Geoff Raby](#) who said, “Strategic cooperation [with China and Asia] rather than US-led strategic competition with China offers not only the most constructive means by which to protect and advance Australia’s interests in the region, it is also the most realistic in view of China’s regional weight and influence. ... Diplomacy, after all, is the only instrument realistically available to ensure Australia’s security. Australia itself can never fund the military defence of the continent, nor can Australia confidently rely on other states to protect us. In the new world order, the safest premise on which to build security policy is that we are on our own. Diplomacy therefore should not be seen as a cost but as an investment in Australia’s future security.”; and
- the Australia Institute’s [Allan Behm](#) who said, “However Australia decides to address its relationship with China, it must be seen to be acting clearly in its own interests, and not as a US franchise.”

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<p>Integrated Strategy for Defence, Diplomacy and Security in Gov12.04, federal parliament will legislate to develop a process of engagement with Australians to develop a Statement of Australia’s Strategic Interests in Territorial Sovereign Defence.</p> <p>Ensure the Green Paper and community engagement process are overseen by DFAT or, if necessary, by another duly appointed independent commission of public engagement with powers to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conduct genuine, fully open and well informed public engagement; • report transparently to parliament on the preferences of Australians for such a Statement; and ultimately • design a Statement that will provide sufficient guidance to parliaments and ensure that any decisions made on territorial defence will in fact be in the acknowledged best interests of Australians and will thereby safeguard our independence, sovereignty, security and peace. <p>As a minimum, the Green Paper should include options for:</p> <p>c) a process by which the nature and limits of Australia’s geopolitical interests may be determined and reviewed every three years in open consultation with Australians; and</p> <p>d) draft principles for possible inclusion in the Statement governing decisions on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • entry into and exit from participation in wars and any other form of military deployment or incursion, 	<p>Gov 1 A proactive participatory democracy.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 65.7% of Australians agreed that Australia should sign the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Only 13% disagreed. <p>Source: Greenpeace Poll on Australians’ attitudes towards nuclear weapons, 19 September 2017</p>
	<p>Gov 5 Open, transparent & accountable in its governments & institutions.</p>	<p>In 2018, 78.9% of Australians on survey said they supported Australia joining the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.</p> <p>Source: Harvard Law School, International Human Rights Clinic, “Australia and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” December 2018.</p>
	<p>Gov 6 A world benchmark in leaders' conduct.</p>	<p>In 2021, the Australian Government, without consultation with the Australian people or its parliaments, entered into an economic and trilateral security pact with the United States and United Kingdom (AUKUS) under which the US and the UK will help Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. The pact was made regardless of any consideration as to whether nuclear capability would be in Australia’s domestic or wider strategic interests and regardless of whether Australia would, by virtue of the pact, be effectively surrendering its independent sovereignty in decisions on future military engagements.</p>
	<p>Gov 11 A just participant on the global stage.</p>	<p>In 2021, Australia had no agreements with the Australian people on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • any statement specifying the nation’s strategic interests (as they relate to defence), • any statement specifying that Australia is required to frame decisions on military engagement and foreign policy as a fully independent
	<p>Soc 1 A safe home.</p>	
	<p>Soc 16 A society prepared & resilient in times of disaster.</p>	

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • escalation and de-escalation of military involvement beyond Australia’s borders, • entry into and exit from military alliances, • entry into and exit from treaties which relate to maintenance of peace or prevention/ cessation of wars, • permissible occupation or prohibition of foreign military and associated intelligence capability on Australian soil, • permissible entry of foreign military forces and transports to Australian waters and ports, • acquisition by the Australian Defence Force of weapons and major military hardware, such as submarines, warships, aircraft, landing equipment, drones, tanks, bombs and other large scale incendiary devices, and detection and surveillance technology, • international cooperation to reduce and/or eliminate nuclear weapons, and • plans to restructure and equip Australia’s military to concentrate on territorial sovereign defence. 		<p>sovereign power acting solely in the interests of Australia,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • any statement which may provide guidance on when or whether alliances may be formed or continued with foreign powers, • the process by which commitments of Australians to military engagements may be made, • the process by which foreign military personnel or installations may be permitted on Australian soil, or • the process for approval of acquisition of nuclear weapons capability and energy generation in Australia. <p>In 2021, Australia was not a signatory to the United Nations Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, although it was a signatory to the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.</p>
<p>Development of the capacity of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and abolition of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Gov12.05</p>	<p>Gov 12 A nation assured of enduring peace.</p>	<p>From around 2017 the Australian government’s foreign policy capability was compromised in its independence, quality and objectives, in large part through the association of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) with foreign arms dealers and</p>

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<p>By 2022, dissolve the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).</p> <p>By 2023, after establishing an Integrated Strategy for Defence, Diplomacy and Security as per Gov12.04, commence a review of the capacity of DFAT to lead in oversight and implementation of the Integrated Strategy, including in policy setting for defence postures and international military relationships to ensure they are aligned with the overarching objectives of the Integrated Strategy for security, national resilience, economic prosperity and peace in our region.</p> <p>By 2024, develop a new workforce plan for DFAT to ensure it retains the capacity for foreign policy development and leadership in implementation of the Integrated Strategy for Defence, Diplomacy and Security.</p> <p>By 2024/25 ensure the new workforce plan is fully costed and funded.</p>	<p>Gov 2 A nation knowing & affirming decency.</p>	<p>the adoption of aggressive and competitive (rather than collaborative) policies in relation to China by ASPI and security agencies such as ASIO.</p> <p>The rise of ASPI, headed by advisers who pushed Australia into the Iraq War, together with a significant diminution of policy capacity in DFAT contributed to what, by 2021, was acknowledged as “the biggest Australian foreign policy disaster in seventy years with the collapse of the relationship with China”.</p> <p>By 2021, institutional arrangements for the development of Australian foreign policy focussed squarely on maintaining peace, cooperation and stability in the Oceania region had failed completely due to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • inappropriate corporate influence in policy agencies, • an excess of confrontational tactics with China, and • insufficient independence in policy determinations – rising from ceding sovereignty to the US in multiple ways, eg., allowing American military installations in Australia, American command of such facilities and decisions on initiation of nuclear attacks, and embedding interoperability in naval and other defence operations. <p>See Note² for baseline reference materials.</p>
	<p>Gov 6 A world benchmark in leaders' conduct.</p>	
	<p>Gov 11 A just participant on the global stage.</p>	
	<p>Gov 13 A nation leading in empathy & global cohesion.</p>	
	<p>Soc 1 A safe home.</p>	
	<p>Econ 9 Productive & prosperous through fair & ethical trade agreements, labour hire & procurement.</p>	

² By 2020 and 2021, multiple experienced commentators and analysts in foreign relations, including former senior diplomats, had coalesced in their views that Australia had not fulfilled the ambitions of the Australia

Note: Baseline data, Indicators, Targets and Strategies in this section will expand in future issues of *Australia Together*, based on availability of data and on the input of Australians.

Government's [2017 Foreign Policy White Paper](#), and had instead dismantled the preferred strategy of that Paper which was based on engagement, constructive cooperation, and in the words of then Prime Minister Turnbull "mutual respect". See Geoff Raby, [China's Grand Strategy and Australia's Future in the New Global Order](#), Melbourne University Press 2020. Other examples include but are not limited to: David Brophy, Senior Lecturer in Modern Chinese History, University of Sydney, [Australia's China policy can't be based on paranoia or corporate interests — there is a better way](#), The Conversation 29 June 2021 **and** Bruce Haigh, "[A sinking DFAT has given policy making over to ASPI](#)", Pearls and Irritations, 29 June 2021.